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Faisal Kutty*
One month after the State of Kansas passed Senate Bill 791 banning the
use of foreign law; a Johnson City district court was faced with the
consequences when Elahm Soleimani sought the enforcement of her Islamic
marriage contract.2 Her contract with Farahmarz Soleimani stipulated a
mahr3 payment of 1,354 gold coins, a value of $677,000 at the time, in the
* Faisal Kutty is an assistant professor of law at Valparaiso University School of Law and an
adjunct professor of Law at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. Prior to academia, he cofounded the Toronto-based firm KSM Law and served as counsel to a coalition of national Muslim
organizations during the faith-based arbitration controversy in Ontario from 2003 to 2005 when the
Ontario government ostensibly “banned” Islamic arbitrations. See Faisal Kutty, The Myth and
Reality of “Shari’a Courts” in Canada: A Delayed Opportunity for the Indigenization of Islamic
Legal Rulings, 7 U. St. Thomas L.J. 559, 559 (2010). The author would like to acknowledge
research assistance from Zahran Khan (J.D. candidate, Temple University Beasley School of Law)
and Ali Chaudhry (J.D. candidate, Leicester University Law School). He would also like to thank
Sana Mirza and Shaikh Ahmad Kutty for their comments, suggestions, and encouragement. The
author remains indebted to them for their help, suggestions, and insights without which this project
would have been left incomplete.
1. S.B. 79, 84th Leg. (Kan. 2012) (enacted).
2. Rafia
Zakaria,
Sharia
Law
Ban
and
Muslim
Wives,
AL JAZEERA,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/201321174724878286.html (last modified Feb.
16, 2013, 15:18).
3. Mahr is a provision of a nuptial contract negotiation by most Muslims who marry according
to Islamic custom, both abroad and domestically. Richard Freeland, The Islamic Institution of Mahr
and American Law, 4 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 2, 2 (2001). Generally, it is considered the husband’s
payment of money to the wife, which can be a small token sum of one dollar or millions of dollars.
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event of divorce.4 From the facts, it appears that Farahmarz was more than
happy to agree to the mahr amount at the time of the marriage given that it
was his second marriage and she was twenty-four years his junior.5
While introducing the bill for a vote on July 1, 2012, State Senator
Susan Wagle told the Kansas Legislature that it was “a vote to protect
women,”6 confirming the suspicions of many that it was specifically
designed to target “Sharī’ah” law.7 Elham would beg to disagree with the

Id. The property received is the legal property of the wife, so it is not a “bride price.” Id. Many
times, there is a portion that is deferred and a portion that comes due immediately. Id.
4. Zakaria, supra note 2. See In re Marriage of Soleimani v. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668 Ch. 23,
Div. 7 (Dist. Ct. of Johnson Cnty., Kan. Civ. Ct. Dep’t Aug. 28, 2012), available at
http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/soleimani.pdf.
5. Zakaria, supra note 2. In traditional Muslim societies the mahr served as a form of security
for women from being divorced or constructively divorced. See id.
6. Zakaria, supra note 2. “This [bill] doesn’t say ‘Sharia law,’” Republican State Senator Chris
Steineger said in a speech that condemned the legislation for discriminating against Muslims, “but
that’s how it was marketed back in January and all session long—and I have all the e-mails to prove
it.” Abed Awad, The True Story of Sharia in American Courts, THE NATION (July 13, 2012),
http://thenation.com/article/168378/true-story-sharia-american-courts#.
7. I use Sharī’ah because anti-Islamic law activists have been using it. Faiza Patel, Matthew
Duss & Amos Toh, Foreign Law Bans: Legal Uncertainties and Practical Problems, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS 1 (May 2013), available at http://americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/
ForeignLawBans.pdf. They are referred throughout as anti-Sharī’ah activists. Some writers also
inaccurately use Sharī’ah and Islamic law interchangeably. See id. at 5. There is also confusion and
conflation of the terms Sharī’ah and Fiqh. Id. The most accurate characterization of what some
people object to are certain Fiqh positions, views or rulings (loosely subsumed under Islamic law).
See id. (explaining that if people are objecting to the “processes of Islamic legal reasoning or the
rulings produced through it,” they are referring to the term fiqh. Sharī’ah encompasses the broad and
overarching principles and methodologies, while fiqh is used to refer to the body of derivative rules
formulated by jurists. Id. Fiqh and Islamic law may be closer in terms of meaning but the two may
also be different depending on context and use. See id. (highlighting the slight difference in meaning
between fiqh and Sharī’ah). Muhammad Asad, the prominent Islamic thinker, narrows down the
Sharī’ah to the nusus, the definitive ordinances of the Qur’ān which are expounded in positive legal
terms. See M. H. Kamali, Source, Nature and Objectives of Shari’ah, 33 ISLAMIC Q. 211, 233
(1989). “Islamic law is far broader and includes those rules and laws that have been derived using
sources and methodologies for deriving laws sanctioned by Islamic jurisprudence, as well as all the
quasi-Islamic laws in existence in Muslim countries as a result of colonization and secularization.”
Id. Islamic law encompasses fiqh (from pre-modern times to contemporary times) as well as the
state sanctioned derivatives and laws. See id. In other words, Islamic law can refer to the following:
(1) classical/medieval/pre-modern iterations of fiqh; (2) the laws in some Muslim nations which are
more accurately an amalgam of common law and/or civil law and manifestations and derivatives of
classical fiqh and modern fiqh; (3) it can refer to the modified classical (traditionalist) fiqh that we
find Muslims practicing to varying degrees in contemporary times without any governmental or state
oversight or direct interference; (4) it can also refer to diverse salafi/modernist/islamist/progressive,
etc. iterations of fiqh (and combinations and permutations thereof), which operate similarly to
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Senator, her self-proclaimed and self-appointed savior. The court refused to
enforce Elham’s request citing various reasons, the most significant for our
purposes being “the religious nature of the [contract].”8 In its August 28,
2012 ruling, the court concluded that “enforcing the agreement . . . would
abdicate the judiciary’s role to protect such fundamental rights [ostensibly
women’s’ rights), a concern that was articulated in Senate Bill No. 79.”9
Essentially the court took the position that enforcing the Islamic contract
would violate the foreign law ban and the “separation of Church and State
[doctrine] under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment” of the
U.S. Constitution.10
This contrasts with a decision the same month in New York in SB v.
WA, where a Muslim-American woman who was married to an Egyptian
man successfully enforced her mahr of $250,000.11 The court upheld the
contract even though it was religious in nature and notwithstanding the fact
that the actual divorce took place in the United Arab Emirates.12
Now rewind back to 1998. That year in another mahr case brought in
the State of Massachusetts, Rima Nahavandi sought a court order compelling
her husband Ahmad to grant her mahr as part of the divorce proceedings.13
Judge Alexander Waugh wrote: “[T]he agreement should be enforced in an
appropriate Islamic tribunal.”14 He identified the threshold questions as:
whether the contract was “a purely secular one governed by [the precedent
of] ‘neutral principles,’” or was it “so inextricably intertwined with the
tenets of the Islamic faith that it cannot be enforced in this Court?”15 Judge
Waugh concluded the latter and refused to order Ahmad Nahavandi to pay

number three. See id. (explaining that Islamic law has a broad definition). For a good visual
representation of the main concepts see Faisal Kutty & Ahmad Kutty, The Kutty Islamic Law
Flowchart, available at http://faisalkutty.com/islamic-law/flowchart/.
8. Id.
9. Zakaria, supra note 2.
10. Id.
11. Id.; S.B. v. W.A., No. 51875(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 26, 2012) (Justicia), available at
https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/other-courts/2012/2012-ny-slip-op-51875-u.html.
12. Id.
13. Sylvia Whitman, Whose Place to Decide? Islamic Family Law Issues in American
Courtrooms, Presented at the Ass’n of Muslim Social Scientists’ 34th Annual Conference: Muslims
and Islam in the Chaotic Modern World: Relations Among Themselves and with Others (Sept. 30–
Oct. 2, 2005) (on file with author) (citing Nahavandi v. Nahavandi, No. FM-12-2237-97, (N.J. Ch.)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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the $20,000 mahr stipulated in the Islamic marriage contract.16 The judge
did state though that if the wife, Rima, was to get a favorable decision from
an Islamic tribunal or Imam, then she could have it enforced through the
courts.17
Before and since the many foreign law/Sharī’ah law ban proposals,
various courts in diverse North American jurisdictions have taken different
positions on such religious questions and proposed different solutions.18
This ground reality of case-by-case decision-making—as disjointed as it is—
challenges the view advocated by proponents of the Sharī’ah law/foreign
law ban that “Islamic law” is overtaking American law.19 Their calls to ban
foreign law/ Sharī’ah law demonstrate a lack of understanding of the
nuances and sophistication of both American law and of course Islamic
law.20

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Jay M. Zitter, Application, Recognition, or Consideration of Islamic Law by Courts in
United States, 82 A.L.R. 6th 1 (2013); see also Asifa Quraishi & Najeeba Syeed-Miller, No Altars:
A Survey of Islamic Family Law in the United States, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS & ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW
177, 177–229 (Lynn Welchman ed., 2004); see also JULIE MACFARLANE, ISLAMIC DIVORCE IN
NORTH AMERICA: A SHARI’A PATH IN A SECULAR SOCIETY (Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
19. The foreign law ban movement, which morphed into the “American law for American
courts” movement, started out as a “ban Sharī’ah law” movement. “Although packaged as an effort
to protect American values and democracy, the bans spring from a movement whose goal is the
demonization of the Islamic faith . . . . The most vociferous proponents of foreign law bans are a
small network of activists who cast Muslim norms and culture, which they collectively and
inaccurately labeled as Sharia law, as one of the greatest threats to American freedom since the Cold
War.” Patel, supra note 7; see also Andrea Elliott, The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/
31shariah.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing the Anti- Sharī’ah law movement as an
“orchestrated drive” begun by David Yerushalmi, “a 56-year-old Hasidic Jew with a history of
controversial statements about race, immigration, and Islam); Wajahat Ali, Matthew Duss, Lee Fang,
Scott Keyes & Faiz Shakir, Fear Inc: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS,
(Aug.
2011)
2,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/08/pdf/
islamophobia.pdf. The recasting as a foreign law/international law ban came after the Oklahoma
save the state referendum banning the use of Islamic law in state courts was deemed
unconstitutional. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670, F.3d 1111, 1129–1131 (10th Cir. 2012). See also Omar
Sacirbey, Anti-Shariah movement changes tactics and gains success, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (May
16 2013), http://www.religionnews.com/2013/05/16/anti-shariah-movement-changes-tactics-andgains-success/.
20. In popular usage, this term raised the specter of stoning women, capital punishment, and
other such fears. See Sherman A. Jackson, What is Shariah and Why Does it Matter?, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 11, 2010, 8:16 PM), http:/www.huffingtonpost.com/sherman-a.jackson/what-is-shariaandwhy-d_b_710976.html. A significant contributing factor to this fear is the Sharī’ah-based laws
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Such cases highlight the tension inherent when courts engage with
religion per se, but in particular Islam and Muslims in the present
Islamaphobic climate.21 There has always been an uneasy relationship
and practices in certain Muslim countries. Arguments in defense of Islam or Islamic jurisprudence
became unwinnable no matter how nuanced or qualified once the term Sharī’ah was associated with
the issue. As Tariq Modood accurately noted in the British context: “Part of the problem is
language. The mere fact of saying something positive about ‘sharia’ leads to knee-jerk hostility
amongst many people, just as the term ‘secularism’ regrettably is understood [by some] Muslims as
a policy of atheism, colonialism or postcolonial despotism. The use of either of these terms can lead
to the closing of minds, however reasonable and qualified what is being said.” Tariq Modood,
Multicultural Citizenship and the Anti-Sharia Storm, OPENDEMOCRACY (Feb. 14, 2008),
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/faith_ideas/europe_islam/anti_sharia_storm. For a detailed
discussion of Islamic law sources, methodology, diversity and potential for evolution see Faisal
Kutty, The Myth and Reality of ‘Shari’a Courts’ in Canada: A Delayed Opportunity for the
Indigenization of Islamic Legal Rulings, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 577–595 (2010). Despite the
nuance—complexity, diversity and changeability in Islamic jurisprudence—opponents have seized
on a fundamentally flawed understanding of “Sharia law.” As explained in a recent report issued by
the Center for American Progress, the “‘Sharia threat’ argument is based on an extreme type of
scripturalism where one pulls out verses from a sacred text and argues that believers will behave
according to that text.” Wajahat Ali & Matthew Duss, Understanding Sharia Law: Conservatives’
Skewed Interpretation Needs Debunking, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 3 (March 2011),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/03/pdf/sharia_law.pdf. But “[t]here is no one thing
called Sharia.” Id. Rather, “[a] variety of Muslim communities exist, and each understands Sharia
in its own way.” Id. Thus, attributing particular beliefs and activities to all Muslims based on the
Quran or other religious writings would be akin to declaring, based on the Bible, that all “Jews stone
disobedient sons to death (Deut. 21:18-21) or that Christians slay all non-Christians (Luke 19:27).”
Id. Moreover, because Sharia “is overwhelmingly concerned with personal religious observance
such as prayer and fasting, and not with national laws,” characterizing it as a threat to our courts or
country “is the same thing as [saying that] all observant Muslims are a threat,” as “[i]t is [impossible
to] find a Muslim who practices any ritual and does not believe himself or herself to be complying
with Sharia.” Id. These fine details fall on deaf ears when hysteria, fear, and emotions take over.
21. Id.; see also NATHAN LEAN, THE ISLAMOPHOBIA INDUSTRY: HOW THE RIGHT
MANUFACTURES FEAR OF MUSLIMS (2012); Haroon Siddiqui, Islamophobia: The new antiSemitism, TORONTO STAR (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.thestar.com/news/insight/2011/09/16/
islamaphobia_the_new_antisemitism.html; Daniel Luban, The New Anti-Semitism, TABLET (Aug.
19, 2010), http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/43069/the-new-anti-semitism-2;
Commission on British Muslims, RUNNYMEDE, www.runnymedetrust.org/projects-andpublications/projects/past-projects/commissionOnBritishMuslims.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014);
Highlights of EUMC Report Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia,
E.U.
AGENCY
FOR
FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS
(Dec.
2006),
http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2006/highlights-eumc-report-muslims-european-uniondiscrimination-and-islamaphobia; Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum Combating
Intolerance (Jan. 30, 2001), available at http://www.fasena.de/download/rechts/SIFCI.pdf; Mark
Potok, FBI: Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes Still Up, SALON (Dec. 10, 2012),
http://www.salon.com/2012/12/10/fbi_anti_muslim_hate_crimes_still_up/; Mark Potok, The
‘Patriot’ Movement Explodes, S. POVERTY L. CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/getinformed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2012/spring/the-year-in-hate-and-extremism
(last
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between religion and law. Since the Enlightenment, secular and religious
elites have been constantly negotiating and renegotiating their respective
spheres of influence and power. In much of the western world, the dominant
discourse and practice became one of strict separation of church and state.22
From this marginalization and premature pronouncement of its demise,
religion has come back from the dead to reclaim an even greater role in the
new world.23 As globalization ramps up and nation-states become more
multi-religious, modern liberal democracies are witnessing even more
complex tensions between law and religion. This has obviously resulted in
more legislation, disputes and of course increased litigation. The US is of
course no exception. As recently as the 1960’s and 1970’s religion had
relatively little place in the current system, but now “the current
system…embraces religion as an important source and dimension of law,
politics and society.”24
This paper argues that in a nation with a constitutional guarantee of
freedom of religion, and which respects the notions of freedom of contract
and legal pluralism, religion must not be excluded outright from the calculus
of court decisions if we are to ensure equal treatment and access to justice in
a multi-religious society. Contrary to those who argue that America is
experiencing creeping Sharī’ah and that courts have caved in to judicial
jihad, this paper posits that courts have simply carried out their
constitutional imperative of equal treatment and religious freedom for all
within the parameters of the Constitution, principles of comity, freedom of
contract, and federal and state public policy goals. Part I introduces the
issue with a macro overview of first amendment jurisprudence. Part II
reviews how U.S. courts have treated cases involving contracts, arbitrations,

visited Mar. 1, 2014).
22. DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY (2003). In contrast, in much of
the Islamic world there was no theoretical separation of the two but in practice the state and the
ulama (jurists and scholars) had their mutually understood spheres of influence and control at least
in the Sunni context. See, e.g., LEON CARL BROWN, RELIGION AND STATE: THE MUSLIM APPROACH
TO POLITICS 1–5 (2000).
23. See, e.g., Wendy Kaminer, The Tea Party’s Religious Inspiration, ATLANTIC (Feb. 25,
2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/02/the-tea-partys-religious-inspiration/7167
9/; Jonathan Merritt, The Rise of the Christian Left in America, ATLANTIC (July 25, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/07/the-rise-of-the-christian-left-in-america/
278086/.
24. John Witte, The Study of Law and Religion in the United States: An Interim Report, 14
ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 327, 329–330.
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defenses, and other personal law matters brought by Muslims or that address
the Islamic faith. Part II also situates this debate through the prism of the
right to contract, the principle of comity and public policy. Part III presents
the argument that, given the essentially multicultural and legal pluralistic
nature of American society, constitutional rights to religious freedom and
freedom of contract will only have any real value when religious
communities, including Muslims, are guaranteed some level of autonomy
and access to justice both within and outside US courthouses. Part V
concludes that far from succumbing to the Sharī’ah bogeyman and an
imaginary judicial jihad, defending religious freedoms and equal treatment
is the only way to remain true to the founding constitutional principles of
this great country.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELIGION IN U.S. COURTS
Religious tribunals, religious schools and vouchers, religious symbols,
the pledge of allegiance, religion and discrimination laws, religious liberty,
personal law and status issues, contracts, and inheritance, among others, are
some of the catalysts that engage law and religion. To appreciate the tension
inherent in these issues, we must first explore the evolving understanding of
the First Amendment in American history. Indeed, the First Amendment’s
protection of religious freedom is one of the most celebrated aspects of the
American liberal tradition.25 Many have argued that this is achieved through
a wall of separation.26 The most acclaimed champion of the notion of a wall
of separation between church and state is America’s founder Thomas
Jefferson.27 In a series of tracts, he argued that true religious liberty can only
25. See, e.g., John Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of Separation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1869,
1869-1905 (2003).
26. See, e.g., id.
27. See Julie A. Oseid, The Power of Metaphor: Thomas Jefferson’s “Wall of Separation
Between Church & State,” 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 123, 132 (2010). Though some
argue that the separation of church and state has no historical foundation in the First Amendment,
Philip Hamburger argues that the detailed evidence shows that eighteenth-century Americans almost
never invoked this principle. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 19 (2002).
Although Thomas Jefferson and others retrospectively claimed that the First Amendment separated
church and state, Hamburger argues that separation became part of American constitutional law only
much later. Id. Others suggest that: “The First Amendment did not conceive religious freedom;
rather, it adopted and incorporated the widely-recognized natural and inalienable right of each
person to worship God according to his or her own conviction and conscience.” See E. Gregory
Wallace, Justifying Religious Freedom: The Western Tradition, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 485, 488
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be attained by privatizing religion and secularizing politics.28 He further
argued that religious privatization is the bargain that must be struck to
contain religious bigotry and ensure religious freedom for all.29 Jefferson, it
is argued, read this understanding of religious liberty into the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . .”30
Without wading into the detailed legislative and judicial histories, this
view of the Establishment Clause, though initially dismissed as too radical,
was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewing Twp.31 Justice Hugo writing for the majority noted: “In
the words of Jefferson, the clause against the establishment of religion by
law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between Church and
State.’”32 Then in 1971, the Supreme Court established a three-part test for
First Amendment Establishment Clause challenges in Lemon v. Kurtzman.33
First, the law must have a secular purpose.34 Second, the primary effect of
the law must not be to advance nor hinder religion.35 Third, the law must not
foster excessive government entanglement with religion.36 All three prongs
must be satisfied to pass constitutional muster.37 As John Witte notes: “This
constitutional reification of Jeffersonian logic rendered the establishment
clause a formidable obstacle to many traditional forms of state patronage of

(2009).
28. See Hamburger, supra note 27; see also DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND
THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002). There are also those who argue
that Jefferson has been misread. See THOMAS S. KIDD, GOD OF LIBERTY: A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2010); see also Patrick M. Garry, The Myth of Separation: America’s
Historical Experience with Church and State, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 475, 494–95 (2004).
29. See Hamburger, supra note 27, at 19.
30. U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. Notwithstanding this view, there is now much scholarship arguing
that Jefferson demanded a firm separation of church and state but never sought a wholly secular
public square. See, e.g., JOHN RAGOSTA, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: JEFFERSON’S LEGACY, AMERICA’S
CREED (2003).
31. 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).
32. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1, 15-16 (1947).
33. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US 602 (1971)
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 613.
37. Id. at 612.
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and co-operation with religion.”38
With respect to the accompanying Free Exercise provision, fast
forwarding to the contemporary era, the Supreme Court under Earl Warren
adopted an expansive view.39 The Court required that states have a
“compelling interest” in refusing to accommodate religiously motivated
conduct in Sherbert v. Verner.40 The case involved Adele Sherbert, who was
denied unemployment benefits by South Carolina because she refused to
work on Saturdays, something forbidden by her Seventh-day Adventist
faith.41 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court ruled that a law that “unduly
burdens the free exercise of religion” without a compelling interest, even
though it might be “neutral on its face,” would be unconstitutional.42 The
“compelling interest” doctrine became much narrower in 1990, when the
Supreme Court held in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith that as long as a law does not target a
particular religious practice, it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.43
In 1993, the Supreme Court revisited the Free Exercise Clause in Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.44 Hialeah had passed an
ordinance banning ritual slaughter, a practice central to the Santería religion,
while providing exceptions for some practices such as the kosher slaughter
of Judaism. Since the ordinance was not “generally applicable,” the Court
ruled that it was subject to the compelling interest test, which it failed to
meet, and was therefore declared unconstitutional.45
Defenders of the Free Exercise Clause argue that it is as a cornerstone of
38. John Witte, The Study of Law and Religion in the United States: An Interim Report, 14
ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 327, 338 (2012).
39. See Alex Geisinger & Ivan E. Bodensteiner, An Expressive Jurisprudence of the
Establishment Clause, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 77 (2007); Joseph A. Ignagni, U.S. Supreme Court
Decision-Making and the Free Exercise Clause, 55 REV. POL. 511, 511–29 (1993).
40. 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
41. Id. at 399.
42. 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
43. 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990).
44. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
45. Id. at 531. Also in 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),
which sought to restore the “compelling interest” standard. In City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) the
Court struck down the provisions of the Act that forced state and local governments to provide
protections exceeding those required by the First Amendment, which the courts enjoy sole power to
interpret. According to the Court’s ruling in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal, RFRA remains applicable to federal statutes, which must therefore still meet the
“compelling interest” standard in free exercise cases. 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006).
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American history and liberty, while critics argue that it grants a privileged
and undeserved legal status to increasingly irrelevant religious
communities.46 Courts in Canada and much of Europe have frequently
turned to proportionality analysis to determine what provisions ought to be
allowed for individuals’ religious liberty.47 In contrast, in the United States,
courts have historically attempted to leave such decisions to legislators.
This clearly goes against the argument of those advocating for a ban on
Sharī’ah law that the courts have been giving in to Sharī’ah.
Recent examples of these tensions in the United States include a wide
range of conflicts, including a proposed circumcision ban in San Francisco,48
the foreign law/Sharī’ah law bans,49 and state laws prohibiting religiouslymotivated business owners from denying services for same-sex weddings.50
Indeed, even the apex court of the nation has itself been called upon to
address recent skirmishes between law and religion, issuing decisions in
both Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
EEOC51 and CLS v. Martinez52 that consider conflicts between antidiscrimination norms and religious liberty. In November 2013, the Court
also heard arguments in Town of Greece v. Galloway,53 where the Court was
asked to determine whether a New York town’s practice of having prayer
before town board meetings violates the establishment clause.54
At the end of 2013, the Court agreed to weigh in on the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act55 (ACA) requirement that employers

46. See Vincent Phillip Munoz, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The
Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083, 1083–1120 (2008); see also
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Curious Chiasma: Rising and Falling Protection of Religious
Freedom and Gender Equality, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 394 (2002).
47. T. Jeremy Gunn, Deconstructing Proportionality in Limitations Analysis, 19 EMORY INT’L
L. REV. LAW 465, 466 (2005).
48. Madison Park, San Francisco judge removes circumcision ban from ballot, CNN (July 28,
2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/07/28/circumcision.ban.voting/.
49. State Legislation Restricting Use of Foreign or Religious Law, PEWRESEARCH: RELIGION
AND PUBLIC LIFE PROJECT (April 8, 2013), http://features.pewforum.org/sharia-law-map/.
50. See, e.g., Initial Decision Granting Complainant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Craig v.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Admin. Ct. Dec. 6, 2013), available at
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/initial_decision_case_no._cr_2013-0008.pdf.
51. 132 S. Ct. 694. (2012).
52. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
53. 681 F. 3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012).
54. Id. at 22.
55. OFFICE OF THE LEGIS. COUNSEL, 111TH CONG. COMPILATION OF PATIENT PROTECTION AND
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provide contraceptive coverage to their employees irrespective of the
employers’ religious objections. The Court has agreed to hear an appeal
from the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which sided with Hobby
Lobby, an Oklahoma-based chain of craft stores owned by a Christian
family who claimed that providing such coverage would violate the
company’s religious freedom.56 At the same time it will hear a related
appeal from the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which denied that
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. had the same religious conscience rights
as an individual.57 Earlier this year, the court also granted a temporary
injunction temporarily baring the Obama administration from enforcing the
Health and Human Services contraceptive mandate under the ACA against
Little Sisters of the Poor.58
A review of case law reveals that people of all faiths have used their
right to seek relief through the courts when they believe their religious
freedom is restricted.59 Indeed, courts throughout America have been called
upon to adjudicate assertions of religious freedom in a variety of contexts
and faiths where religious beliefs and practices conflict with state law..60
This should not cause any concerns provided that courts do not become
improperly entangled with religion. Anti-Sharī’ah advocates point to Allah
v. Adella Jordan-Luster,61 as an example of wading improperly into
religion.62 Shaheed’s claim that the prison violated his free exercise rights
by not ensuring that all the meat served to him was prepared in accordance
with his Islamic beliefs was rejected by the court.63 Contrary to what antiSharī’ah advocates claim, rather than caving in to this instance of “Judicial

AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2010), available at http://housedocs.house.gov/energycommerce/
ppacacon.pdf (Sandra L. Strokoff & Edward G. Grossman).
56. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F. 3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.
Ct. 678 (2013).
57. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013).
58. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 893, 893 (2013).. As of
February 13, 2014, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty documents ninety-three challenges to the
ACA HHS contraceptive mandate. Legal Challenges to the HHS Mandate, THE BECKETT FUND FOR
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last viewed Feb. 13, 2014).
59. See Patel, supra note 7, at 1.
60. Id.
61. No. 04-1083, 2007 WL 2582199 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2007).
62. Spearit, Religion as Rehabilitation? Reflections on Islam in the Correctional Setting, 34
WHITTIER L. REV. 29, 42 (2012).
63. Allah, 2007 WL 2582199, at *10.
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Jihad,” the court ruled against the Muslim inmate and held that the prison’s
practice of serving pork-free meals was sufficient accommodation.64
Anti-Sharī’ah advocates appear to have a problem with someone even
raising Islam in court, while apparently not having any issues with other
groups raising similar arguments.65 Many of them appear to blame Muslims
for what they see as increasing porousness of the wall of separation.66 The
wall of separation is clearly not as solid or as impermeable as once thought,
but for reasons other than those advanced by anti-Sharī’ah advocates—
Islam and Muslims.67 This shift has been taken place not because of foreign
law and certainly not due to any takeover by Sharī’ah advocates. 68 It has
simply been a response to the demands from American society.69 Religious
scholar John Witte, for instance, writes:
Over the past 30 years, the Supreme Court has been quietly defying
its earlier separationist logic and has reversed some of its harshest

64. Id.
65. Courts have recognized that, “[u]nder both the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA in its most
elemental form, a prisoner has a ‘clearly established . . . right to a diet consistent with his . . .
religious scruples[.]’ . . . A prison official violates this clearly established right if he intentionally
and without sufficient justification denies an inmate his religiously mandated diet.” Lovelace v. Lee,
472 F.3d 174, 198–99 (4th Cir. 2006) (granting Muslim inmate’s request for Ramadan meal). In fact,
inmates of diverse faiths routinely request religious diets. Courts grant or deny such requests taking
into consideration a number of factors, including the nature of the inmate’s claimed religious beliefs,
the sincerity of such beliefs, and the institutional justification, if any, for refusing the request. See,
e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 869 (7th Cir.2009) (finding that denying a non-meat diet during
Lent and on Fridays substantially burdened the religious practice of a Roman Catholic prisoner);
See, e.g., Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that federal prison was required
to provide Orthodox Jewish inmate with kosher meals consistent with his religious beliefs); See, e.g.,
Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2008) (ordering religious diet requested by inmate follower
of Thelema – a magic-based faith).
66. See John Witte, Jr., From Establishment to Freedom of Public Religion, 32 CAP. U. L. REV.
499 (2004) for a discussion of the break down of the wall of separation of church and state.
67. JAMES HITCHCOCK, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE, VOL. 1: THE
ODYSSEY OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES (2004); John Witte, Jr., From Establishment to Freedom of
Religion, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 499, 513 (2004) (suggesting that recent cases indicate a shift toward
freedom of public religion); Steven D. Smith, How Secularists Helped Knock Down the Wall of
Separation between Church and State, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (Nov. 8, 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028602 (explaining the dissolution of the wall separating church and
state).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Separation of Church and State, BOISI CTR. PAPERS ON RELIGION IN THE U.S.,
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/boisi/pdf/bc_papers/BCP-ChurchState.pdf (last visited
Feb. 13, 2014).
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separationist precedents…The Court has defended these more
recent holdings on wide-ranging constitutional grounds; among
other arguments, as a proper accommodation of religion under the
establishment clause; as a necessary protection of religion under the
free speech or free exercise clauses; and a simple application of the
equal protection clause. Collectively, these cases have shifted the
centre of gravity of the First Amendment religion clauses from
separationism and secularization to equal treatment of public and
private religious expression.”70
The evidence clearly reveals that this is not the fault of Muslims or
Islamic law.71 Indeed, as a report by the Brennan Center concluded: “When
adjudicated within the guidelines of the First Amendment, cases involving
Muslims’ right to free exercise no more threaten the imposition of Sharia
law than, for example, cases involving the rights of Christians pose a
‘Biblical threat’ to our courts.”72
II. CASES INVOKING CONTRACT PRINCIPLES, COMITY AND PUBLIC POLICY
Disputes involving religion in different manifestations and at various
levels set these competing interests into stark contrast and pose complex
questions to secular judges. In addition to religious liberty cases, in a
growing number of cases, the courts as ultimate arbiters of law are called
upon to resolve tensions and determine rights and responsibilities pursuant
to certain religious arrangements and settlements.73 These have included
cases involving arbitrations, contracts, business disputes, family and other
personal law matters and even cases where defenses rely on manifestations
of Muslim culture and different interpretations of Islam are raised.74

70. Witte, supra note 24, at 339–40.
71. See Patel, supra note 7, at 1.
72. ACLU PROGRAM ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF, NOTHING TO FEAR: DEBUNKING
THE MYTHICAL “SHARIA THREAT” TO OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM 1 (May 2011), available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Nothing_To_Fear_Report_FINAL_MAY_2011.pdf.
73. See, e.g., Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
74. There is of course no monolithic Muslim culture or one single understanding of Islam. In
fact, Islamic law and culture is deeply contested, interpreted and practiced in a multitude of ways.
See, e.g., Asifa Quraishi-Landes, Sharia and Diversity: Why Some Americans are Missing the Point
INST.
FOR
SOC.
POL’Y
&
UNDERSTANDING
(JAN.
2013),
http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU_Report_ShariaDiversity_Final_web.pdf; see also Kutty, supra note
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Addressing these issues demands a consideration not only of how to weigh
the competing interests addressed in Part I, but also of the extent to which
secular authorities should assess religious obligations.75 As the Brennan
Center report notes:
“The anti-Sharia movement also distorts how U.S. Courts treat
Sharia and other religious codes such as Catholic canon law and
Jewish law. Many persons of faith—including Muslims, Jews, and
Catholics—arrange their everyday lives according to religious laws
and customs.”76
American courts have traditionally recognized their ability to consider
such cases provided that they are able to adjudicate them using neutral
principles of law.77 These types of cases also engage the notion of freedom
of contract, the principle of comity and public policy.78 Though not
necessarily distinct or mutually exclusive at all times, each of these have a
long track record in the American legal tradition and I would argue have
served the nation well.
There is a well-known common law tradition of freedom of contract
which has entrenched itself in the American psyche.79 The idea of freedom
of contract has always elicited heated debate among scholars and the U.S.
Supreme Court has tackled and addressed the issue under the contract clause
in Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause.80 Without getting into the technical details, the liberty of
contract doctrine survives but with significant powers enjoyed by the state to

20, at 558–97.
75. See Patel, supra note 7, at 5.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979). Courts can enforce agreements that are
drafted with religious principles provided that they meet the requirements of secular law. Id.
78. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive and are not always distinctly engaged.
79. See, e.g., F. H. BUCKLEY, THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (Duke Univ.
Press, 1999); P. S. ATIYA, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, (Oxford Univ. Press.
1979); Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, Freedom of Contracts (Columbia Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 458, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2325254 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2325254.
80. See generally DAVID. E. BERNSTEIN, FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (2008) available at
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/0851%20Freedom%20of%20Con
tract.pdf.
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restrict this right.81
This raises the question: can we support the idea that the state has the
right to interfere in how citizens might decide, by mutual consent, to
peacefully settle their private disputes and disagreements? This of course
goes against the liberal democratic notion of individual freedom and the
latitude to make decisions about one’s own life. The issue of arbitrations
and Islamic contracts—family or business—is really one of freedom of
contract.82
Obviously it would be discriminatory to prohibit courts from
entertaining such matters merely because Islam was involved without
evaluating the merits and substance against long established American
judicial practice and legal precedent. This is precisely what many antiSharī’ah advocates are proposing.83 A June 2011 report published by a
right-wing center founded by anti-Muslim activist Frank Gaffney stated that
“Shariah law has entered into state court decisions, in conflict with the
Constitution and state public policy.”84 The group’s general counsel
happens to be none other than the man behind the Sharī’ah ban campaign,
David Yerushalmi.85 The report also claims that there were 150 cases
invoking what it inaccurately calls Sharī’ah law in state courts in 23 states.86
The report also compiled a list of the “Top 20” cases where judges
purportedly deferred to Sharī’ah law.87

81. Id. Two caveats are in order with respect to this. See id. First, these cases involved
business and commercial enterprise. Second, the case law does not negate the idea of freedom of
contract but simply provides that the right may be restricted by the state in its attempts to prevent
injury or advance its public policy goals.
82. See Patel, supra note 7, at 23–24. Arguably with more scrutiny and checks and balances in
the family context necessary given the greater potential for inter alia abuse, exploitation, coercion,
unequal bargaining power and social pressure. See id. at 25–27.
83. See id. at 5–8.
84. CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, SHARIAH LAW AND AMERICAN STATE COURTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF
STATE
APPELLATE
COURT
CASES
8
(May
20,
2011),
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2012/08/30/shariah-law-and-american-state-courts/. See also
Intelligence Files Profiles: Frank Gaffney, Jr., S. POVERTY L. CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/getinformed/intelligence-files/profiles/frank-gaffney-jr. (last visited Feb. 13, 2014); see also Issues:
Shariah Law, AM. PUB. POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://publicpolicyalliance.org/issues-2/shariah-law/ (last
visited Feb. 13, 2014).
85. Andrea Elliott, The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/31shariah.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
86. CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, supra note 84, at 10–11.
87. Id. at 29–42.
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One of the cases put forth as evidence of the Sharī’ah onslaught is a
business partnership dispute arbitration, Abd Alla v. Mourssi.88 Far from
being part of a stealth Sharī’ah invasion, the court merely upheld an
arbitration award because there was no evidence that the award “was [the]
result of fraud, corruption, or other undue means.”89 The court also held that
the defendant had run out of time to challenge the tribunal decision.90
Alternative dispute resolution is an option that any American can resort
to.91 Arbitration is one of these alternatives.92 It is one of myriad ways
through which people can resolve their disputes.93 The process is based on
contract law within the parameters of Constitution, public policy, and
arbitration laws.94 Within these parameters parties have significant amount
of freedom in its design and in crafting their terms of reference.95 For
instance, parties have full rights to choose what rules will govern the
resolution of the dispute—be it religious, secular, the law of other
jurisdictions (subject to choice of law and conflict of law rules), or any other
mutually agreed upon rules.96 While a party cannot unilaterally withdraw
from the process after agreeing to arbitration, the process can be altered or
terminated if both parties consent.97 As with any contractual arrangement,
courts can stay a pending action while the matter is being arbitrated.98
Courts can also be called upon to enforce arbitral decisions and will do so
provided that they are not contrary to public policy, discriminatory, totally
irrational, or unconscionable.99
88. 680 N.W.2d 569, 574 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Katherine V.W. Stone, Alternative Dispute Resolution, in Encyclopedia of Legal History
(Stan Katz, ed., Oxford Univ. Press), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=631346.,
92. Joseph L. Daly, Arbitration: The Basics, 5 J. Am. Arb. 1 (2006).
93. Jerome T. Barrett & Joseph P. Barrett, A History of Alternative Dispute Resolution: The
Story of a Political, Cultural, and Social Movement (2004)
94. Daly, supra note 92, at 1.
95. Id. at 14–16.
96. See id. at 16; see also Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New
Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1231, 1243–44 (2011)
(discussing that United States courts will enforce religious arbitration awards).
97. See, e.g., Wein v. Morris, 909 A.2d 1186, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (quoting
McKeeby v. Arthur, 81 A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 1951)) (“exercise of jurisdiction as arises out of the
agreement to arbitrate may be lifted by the consent or waiver of the parties.”).
98. Daly, supra note 92, at 16, n.63.
99. See Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial
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As with almost all dispute resolution methods, arbitration must be
jointly and voluntarily chosen by the parties to the dispute and cannot be
imposed against their will.100 The only mandatory dispute resolution option
is the court system; a party filing a claim or bringing an action or application
through the courts can compel the other party to respond.101 Even in cases
that proceed through the courts, the initiating party must take the first step
by filing a claim or otherwise bringing the matter to a court.102 Generally, an
affected party is under no obligation to enforce his rights, whether it be
through the courts or otherwise.103
The fear mongering with respect to Islamic arbitration is all the more
hypocritical and discriminatory when one considers that various other
communities have been arbitrating without outrage or objection.104 Such a
blanket opposition is clearly against long established American ideals of
freedom of contract, other contract law principles, and encouraging people
to resolve disputes outside the courts, while providing access to the courts to
uphold agreements and promises that are within established and accepted
parameters.105
In the case of a marriage contract or family dispute, arbitration may
entail agreeing for a local committee of religious leaders to rule on the
division of property following a divorce; or, in the case of a business
transaction, it might be deciding that a private arbitration organization or
industry association rules on any disagreements.106 The point is that the
arbitration body—regardless of whether it is a Rabbinical court, an Islamic

Arbitration Awards, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 730, 764 (1996) (discussing the various non-statutory grounds
under which vacatur is granted); see also Eugene Volokh, Religious Law (Especially Islamic Law) in
American Courts, 66 Okla. L. Rev. 431, 435–36 (2014).
100. One argument is that women will be forced to submit to arbitration, but this risk is there
whether it be religious or non-religious arbitration or even judicial proceedings. See Daly, supra
note 92, at 15; Volokh, supra note 99, at 453.
101. Not responding may mean that a judgment or decision may be made without your
participation.
102. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”).
103. Amanda M. Baker, A Higher Authority: Judicial Review of Religious Arbitration, 37 Vt. L.
Rev. 157, 162 (2012).
104. See, e.g., Caryn Litt Wolfe, Faith-Based Arbitration: Friend or Foe? An Evaluation of
Religious Arbitration Systems and Their Interaction with Secular Courts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 427,
437–40 (2006); see also Helfand, supra note 96 at 1232–40.
105. See Baker, supra note 103, at 162.
106. It should be noted that many parties may not even be able to agree on the arbitrator,
rendering this whole issue moot.
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tribunal, or a secular body—derives its authority from the consent of the
parties requesting arbitration within the confines of established laws,
procedures, and public policy.107 The fact that the parties are choosing to
settle their disagreements by reference to their understanding of Islamic law
is therefore of no more consequence to society than if they decided to settle
the same dispute by tossing a coin, asking a neighbor to decide, or any of the
other ways in which human beings settle disagreements peacefully.108
In the matrimonial context, anti-Sharī’ah advocates have pointed to a
number of cases to evince the threat posed by Muslims. One such case is
Odatalla v. Odatalla, where the wife appealed to the courts to enforce the
mahr provision of her Islamic prenuptial agreement or marriage contract.109
The court held that “all of the essential elements of a contract [were]
present” and ordered the husband to pay $10,000 to his wife.110 The court
noted that enforcement was “based upon ‘neutral principles of law’ and not
on religious policy or theories.”111 Illustrative for our purposes, the judge
wrote: “Why should a contract for the promise to pay money be less of a
contract just because it was entered into at the time of an Islamic marriage
ceremony? . . . . Clearly, this court can enforce a contract which is not in
contravention of established law or public policy.”112
The evidence, even in the cases put forth by anti-Sharī’ah advocates,
proves that courts make such determinations on a case-by-case basis. In
fact, in Zawahir v. Alwattar,113 the court applied the same contract principles
and refused to enforce a mahr agreement because the husband only entered

107. See Baker, supra note 103, at 165.
108. Of course, this is provided that there is no question of duress, unconscionability, bias, or
violation of public policy. There is also a great deal of debate and discussion about privatization of
justice and the possible dangers to the vulnerable. See, e.g., Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A
Cautionary Tale from Religious Arbitration in Family Law, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L.573–607
(2008). Although there are some legitimate issues here, it must be noted that these problems are not
limited to the religious context alone and would not justify banning religious alternative dispute
resolution but not others.
109. 810 A.2d 93, 94 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002); see also Asifa Quraishi & Najeeba SyeedMiller, No Altars: A Survey of Islamic Family Law in the United States, in Women’s Rights and
Islamic Family Law: Perspectives on Reform (Lyn Welchman, ed., 2004) (discussing whether it
should be treated as a pre-nuptial agreement or a simple contract and citing Muslim lawyer, Abed
Awad, who has extensive litigation in this area).
110. Odatalla, 810 A.2d at 98.
111. Id. at 95–96.
112. Id. at 95.
113. No. 07AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2008).
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into it “as a result of overreaching or coercion.”114
In addition to cases revolving around mahr agreements, courts have also
been called upon to determine the validity of marriages conducted in
accordance with religious law. In fact, in many instances Muslim couples
perform religious ceremonies without following through with the legal
registration.115 Courts are often asked to adjudicate the validity of such
marriages as a precursor to determining the other rights flowing from such
relationships. In Mussa v. Palmer-Mussa, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals recognized a couple’s Islamic marriage, but not their religious
divorce.116 In Aleem v. Aleem, a Maryland court held that a talaq (Islamic
divorce), granted in Pakistan, was unenforceable because, by being
accessible only to men, talaq was against public policy under the Equal
Rights Amendment of the Maryland Constitution, and it denied due process
rights to women.117
In the context of custody, American courts have for some time applied
the best interest of the child test.118 This test would, presumably, apply
regardless of whether the court was interpreting a religious or non-religious
contract, reviewing an arbitration agreement, or enforcing a foreign
judgment or settlement related to child custody. The courts also have
inherent common law parens patriae120 jurisdiction, often supplemented by
statute, to intervene when and if necessary to ensure that the best interests of
vulnerable children are protected in all contexts.121

114. Id. at *6.
115. See
Ruqaiyyah
Waris
Magsood,
Weddings,
BBC
(Sept.
8,
2009),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/ritesrituals/weddings_1.shtml.
116. 719 S.E.2d 192, 194 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 731 S.E.2d (N.C. 2012).
117. 947 A.2d 489, 500–02 (Md. 2008).
118. See Christian Reichel Van Deusen, The Best Interest of the Child and the Law, 18 PEPP. L.
REV. 417, 419–20 (1991); see also Steven N. Peskind, Determining the Undeterminable: The Best
Interest of the Child Standard as an Imperfect but Necessary Guidepost to Determine Child Custody,
25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 449, 450 (2005).
120. See Daniel B. Griffith, The Best Interests Standard: A Comparison of the State’s Parens
Patriae Authority and Judicial Oversight in Best Interests Determinations for Children and
Incompetent Patients, 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 283, 287–88 (1992); see also Lawrence B. Custer, The
Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L. J. 195, 195–96 (1978).
121. Judith Areen, Intervention between the Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State’s Role
in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L. J. 887, 894–910 (1975) (providing a historical
account of the parens patriae doctrine); Tanya Washington, Throwing Black Babies Out With the
Bathwater: A Child-Centered Challenge to Same-Sex Adoption Bans, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY
L.J. 1, 30 (2009) (noting that a “child’s best interests provide the sole justification for state’s
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Other cases brought up by anti-Sharī’ah activists as evidence of
creeping Sharī’ah involve Muslim business people attempting to use Islamic
principles in business dealings; innocuous attempts to work around interest
prohibitions; zoning and property disputes, attempts to have judgments from
Islamic jurisdictions enforced; and even attempts to raise defenses relying on
interpretations of Islamic law or a certain Muslim cultural practices or
views122 Anti-Sharī’ah advocates have pounced on situations where parties
attempt to have American courts enforce decisions made in foreign courts.123
In such contexts, it may be necessary for an American court to consider the
foreign law applied to determine whether to defer to the foreign court’s
decision. This principle of comity, whereby courts of one nation voluntarily
recognize the executive, legislative, and judicial acts of another, has a long
history in America.124 Scholars disagree about whether it is a rule of
customary international law, but the fact remains that comity plays a
significant role in American domestic jurisprudence.125 In evaluating foreign
law cases, American courts consider whether the foreign jurisdiction’s
decision, judgment, order, and the legal systems practices and procedures

exercise of its parens patriae authority”).
122. See generally, Patel, supra note 7; CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, supra note 84.
123. One of the main proponents of the anti-Sharī’ah law movement, the American Public Policy
Alliance (APPA) notes: “These foreign laws, frequently at odds with U.S. constitutional principles
of equal protection and due process, typically enter the American court system through: [c]omity
(mutual respect of each country’s legal system)[;] [c]hoice of law issues[;] and [c]hoice of forum or
venue.” American Laws for American Courts, AM. PUB. POL’Y ALLIANCE, (last visited Feb. 15,
2014)
[hereinafter
American
Laws]
(emphasis
omitted),
http://publicpolicyalliance.org/legislation/american-laws-for-american-courts.
124. Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 38
(2008). William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Courts, 1 (unpublished manuscript)
available at https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/11719956/william-s-dodge-americansociety-of-international-law.
125. Dodge, supra note 124, at 39. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States suggests that comity is a rule of customary international law, but some scholars argue
that this is not in line with state practice. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE U.S. § 403 cmt. a (1987). As the Supreme Court noted in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–
64, 167 (1895): “‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws. . . . A judgment affecting the status of persons,
such as a decree confirming or dissolving a marriage, is recognized as valid in every country, unless
contrary to the policy of its own law.”
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violate federal or state public policy.126
Anti-Sharī’ah advocates have cited a number of cases to back their
tenuous claim that Sharī’ah is stealthily sneaking in through the doctrine of
comity, but a close examination of the cases they have highlighted
contradicts their claim. In Amin v. Bakhaty, the Louisiana Supreme Court
refused to enforce a custody order as being against public policy because
Egyptian law did not consider the child’s best interest as “paramount.”127 In
Aleem v. Aleem, a Maryland court refused to enforce Pakistani law
pertaining to divorce and division of assets because Pakistani law did not
afford the wife due process, in violation of state public policy.128 In
Tarikonda v. Pinjari, a Michigan court denied the recognition of a divorce
conducted according to Indian laws governing Muslim marriage because the
wife was not afforded due process or equal protection rights, and the divorce
thus violated state public policy.129 In contrast, in two other cases cited by
anti-Sharī’ah advocates—Hosain v. Malik130 and Saleh v. United States
Department of Justice131—both courts concluded that public policy and
American due process standards were not violated.132 Even in a non-family
126. Where foreign law conflicts with state public policy, courts refuse to recognize or apply it.
See, e.g., Innes v. Carrascosa, 918 A.2d 686, 710 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (holding that,
because child custody order issued by court of Spain “contravene[s] the public policy of this state
that both parents should share in the custodial rights of the child absent a finding that it would not be
in the best interest of the child, comity cannot be afforded”); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230,
249 (Md. 1997) (declining to enforce British court’s libel judgment because “[t]he principles
governing defamation actions under English law . . . are so contrary to Maryland defamation law,
and to the policy of freedom of the press underlying Maryland law, that [the] judgment should be
denied recognition under principles of comity”); Al-Fassi v. Al-Fassi, 433 So.2d 664, 668 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (noting, with respect to child custody order issued by Bahamian court, that “the
principles of comity do not require recognition since the decree is offensive to a public policy of our
state, i.e., that a custody decision be based upon the best interests and welfare of the minor
children”).
127. 798 So.2d 75, 86 (La. 2001).
128. 947 A.2d 489, 500 (Md. 2008).
129. No. 287403, 2009 WL 930007 (Mich. App. Apr. 7, 2009).
130. 671 A.2d 988 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (examining “whether the Pakistani courts applied a
rule of law, evidence, or procedure so contradictory to Maryland public policy as to undermine the
confidence in the trial”).
131. 962 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1992).
132. In Hosain v. Malik, the court granted comity to a Pakistani court’s child custody order. 671
A.2d 988, 1003 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996). The court held that Pakistan applied the best interest of
the child test and that “[t]he evidence was overwhelming that, as a general principle, Pakistan
follows the best interest of the child test in making child custody decisions.” Id. at 998. In Saleh v.
United States Department of Justice, 962 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1992), a federal court refused to reverse
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case, Rhodes v. ITT Sheraton Corp.,133 an American court determined that a
Saudi Arabian court would not be an adequate alternative forum for a female
plaintiff to pursue her claims for a diving injury because of “biases against
women and non-Muslims [and] . . . systemic prejudices.”134
Far from supporting the position advanced by anti-Sharī’ah activists,
these cases reveal that courts have granted comity only when doing so would
not violate public policy or cherished American due process rights. Indeed,
even one of the main proponents of the anti-Sharī’ah law movement, the
American Public Policy Alliance (“APPA”), acknowledges that:
Granting comity to a foreign judgment is a matter of state law, and
most state and federal courts will grant comity unless the
recognition of the foreign judgment would violate some important
public policy of the state. This doctrine, the “Void as against Public
Policy Rule,” has a long and pedigreed history.135
The last types of cases that anti-Sharī’ah advocates have attacked
involve those where criminal defendants use their religious beliefs as a
defense to vitiate their culpability.136 Again, this is not new or restricted to
Muslims.137 There is a growing body of scholarship exploring this issue as
part of individuals’ due process rights to assert their lack of intent.138 Again,

a deportation order for a Yemeni man released from state prison after serving a sentence for
murdering a fellow Yemeni. Id. at 240. The man claimed that he would be persecuted upon his
return to Yemen because a Yemeni Islamic court had sentenced him to death for the murder. Id. at
237–38. After examining Yemeni law, the appeals court rejected the defense, holding that “the
nondiscriminatory application of Yemeni criminal law to his intentional killing of a fellow Yemeni
Moslem” and “imposing a punishment that would be inflicted in many secular jurisdictions” did not
amount to persecution. Id. at 237, 239.
133. No. CIV.A. 97-4530-B, 1999 WL 26874, at *1, *3 (Mass. Super. 1999).
134. Id.at *3.
135. American Laws, supra note 123 (emphasis omitted).
136. See, e.g., Ave Mince-Didier, Cultural and Religious Defenses to Criminal Charges,
CRIMINAL
DEFENSE
LAWYER.COM
(2014),
http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/cultural-and-religious-defenses-criminalcharges.htm.
137. Id.
138. See generally, Kent Greenawalt, The Cultural Defense: Reflections in Light of the Model
Penal Code and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 299 (2009); Alison
Dundes Renteln, The Cultural Defense: Challenging the Monocultural Paradigm, CULTURAL
DEFENSE (Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://www.unipa.it/dottoratodirittiumani/seminari_dottorato_
archivio_2010/maggio_10/Renteln_Bruylant.pdf.
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courts have not rejected these arguments outright, but they have measured
them against American public policy.139 Anti-Sharī’ah activists went as far
back as 1976 to find the case of People v. Benu, where a Muslim man was
charged with child endangerment for arranging the marriage of his underage
daughter.140 The court rejected his “Islamic” argument and found him guilty,
just as courts have done in religious defenses raised by Christians.141
Despite the fact that it is not an exclusively Muslim issue and that it is far
more nuanced and complex then they have made it out to be, anti-Sharī’ah
activists were able to latch onto one trial judge’s ruling in New Jersey
(which was correctly overturned by a New Jersey court of appeals) to prove
that Sharī’ah was taking over America.142 As Abed Awad writes:
The Sharia scaremongers often rely on a single New Jersey case,
S.D. v. M.J.R., as proof that Islamic law is seeping into our court
system. In it, a wife sought a restraining order against her husband,
alleging that he repeatedly beat and sexually assaulted her. The
judge denied her request, holding that the defendant did not form
the criminal intent necessary to commit the crime, because his
genuine religious beliefs dictated that he was entitled to sexual
relations upon demand. The ruling was wrong—both under state
law and Sharia—and, not surprisingly, the New Jersey Appellate
Court reversed it in 2010.143
III. MULTICULTURALISM AND LEGAL PLURALISM
Effective governance in contemporary liberal societies requires
balancing individuals’ religious commitments and convictions with the
state’s need to maintain general rules and standards applicable to all. While
these debates implicate a wide range of very broad philosophical, social and
139. See infra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
140. 87 Misc. 2d 139, 140 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1976).
141. In the case of Scott Roeder, convicted for murdering abortion provider Dr. George Tiller, the
court rejected his argument that his religious beliefs about abortion being murder should mitigate his
culpability. See Robin Abcarian, Scott Roeder Convicted of Murdering Abortion Doctor George
Tiller, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/29/nation/la-na-tiller-trial302010jan29. Criminal defendants in polygamy cases who put forth religious arguments to vitiate their
intent where are also found guilty. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946).
142. S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 413 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2010).
143. Awad, supra note 6.

1081

[Vol. 41: 1059, 2014]

“Islamic Law” in US Courts
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

constitutional considerations, another recurring theme is the unique
challenge of reconciling conflicts not just between religion and law, but
between “religious legal communities” and the law of the nation-state.144
American Muslim and Jewish communities serve as prime examples of such
religious legal communities—that is, communities that experience some of
their religious norms through the prism of “legal” rules—and thus the
challenges faced by these communities often parallel each other in important
ways.145 What is worthy of note here is that the focus has been on trying to
deny Muslims an equal seat in the dockets.146
A popular war cry of anti-Sharī’ah advocates in a number of western
jurisdictions has been “one law for all”147 and in the American context, this
has morphed into “American Law for American Courts.”148 These rallying
cries are, at worst, disingenuous and, at best, inaccurate because these
jurisdictions permit parties a variety of routes, options, and choices in
resolving their legal issues within a legal framework and, in many cases,
even allow parties to opt out of statutory regimes.149 In addition to the
foregoing, in the United States there is diversity between states and between

144. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
145. Muhammed Elsayed, Contracting Into Religious Law: Anti-Sharia Enactments and the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 20 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 937, 937–38 (2013).
146. See infra notes 145–49 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., One Law For All—Against Sharia Law in Britain, ONE LAW FOR ALL: NO SHARIA
CAMPAIGN (Aug. 2008), http://onelawforallpetition.com/onelaw/onela300.php?nr=40155035;
http://www.onelawforall.org.uk/; see also Harvey Simmons, One Law for All Ontarians, STAR (Sept.
14,
2010),
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2010/09/14/one_law_for_all_
ontarians.html.
148. American Laws, supra note 123. This of course shifted after their defeat in Oklahoma when
Islamic law was specifically targeted. See, e.g., American Law, supra note 123.
149. As Natasha Bakht, who wrote a report that various women’s groups used in opposing faithbased arbitration in Ontario, points out in a reconsidered article published after the controversy:
In fact, it is disingenuous to speak of “one law for all” when Ontario’s family law permits
parties to opt out of the default statutory regime such as the equal division of matrimonial
property. Parties can, through negotiation, mediation or arbitration, based on the right to
contract freely, agree to almost any resolution of their marital affairs . . . . [C]ouples’
decisions to settle their family law affairs are generally left un-reviewed by the courts.
See Natasha Bakht, Were Muslim Barbarians Really Knocking on the Gates of Ontario?: The
Religious Arbitration Controversy—Another Perspective, OTTAWA L. REV. 67, 67–82 (2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121790. Indeed, if the right
existed for people to opt out of the existing family law regime, why should religious people be
prevented from structuring settlements consistent with their values and beliefs, again subject to the
usual contractual and common law protections and mechanisms for review?
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states and the federal realm.150 Moreover, these simplistic slogans deny the
reality on the ground in terms of the prevailing multiculturalism, legal
pluralism, choices and options to opt out.
The foreign law and Sharī’ah law ban controversy is a compelling case
study in multiculturalism151 and legal pluralism.152 A multicultural society
inherently accepts the idea that the various subgroups within society will
celebrate their differences in all areas including the legal arena. Indeed, this
is the essence of multicultural citizenship and stands in stark contrast to the
cultural assimilation traditionally demanded of migrants and minorities.153
Many nations around the world have officially adopted multiculturalism
though the United States has not officially done so.154 Nevertheless, a strong
argument can be made that multiculturalism is the most accurate
characterization of the ethnic interrelationships and diversity in the United
States.155
The nature and limits of multicultural and multi-religious
accommodation within liberal democracies has been the subject of
considerable scholarship over the last few decades.156 The primary focus of
pioneering theorists such as Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka has been the
legal accommodation claims of minorities.157 Much of this discussion has
centered on issues of internal self-governance and legal pluralism.158 Indeed,
as Jeff Spinner-Halev and Jacob Levy argue, if liberty is to be meaningful,

150. See supra Part II and accompanying text.
151. Multiculturalism is essentially the idea that a diversity of cultures can coexist within a single
national state. See generally CHARLES TAYLOR ET AL., MULTICULTURALISM (1994); TARIQ
MODOOD, MULTICULTURALISM (2d ed. 2007); Faisal Bhabha, Between Exclusion and Assimilation:
Experimentalizing Multiculturalism, 54 MCGILL L.J. 45, 51 (2009).
152. Legal pluralism is the notion that individuals and groups are bound by and respect a plurality
of legal orders within that state. John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM
& UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 38 (1986); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869, 870
(1988).
153. JOSEPH F. HEALEY, RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER, AND CLASS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF GROUP
CONFLICT AND CHANGE 45 (6th ed. 2012).
154. Bhabha, supra note 149, at 51.
155. John A. Garcia, A Multicultural America: Living in a Sea of Diversity, in
MULTICULTURALISM FROM THE MARGINS 29, 29–38 (Dean A. Harris ed. Bergin & Garvey 1995).
156. WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989); RICHARD A. SHWEDER
ET AL., ENGAGING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: THE MULTICULTURAL CHALLENGE IN LIBERAL
DEMOCRACIES (Richard A. Shweder et al. eds., 2002).
157. KYMLICKA, supra note 154; TAYLOR, supra note 149.
158. See Griffiths, supra note 150; Merry, supra note 150.
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the liberal state must protect the freedom of religious communities to govern
their lives according to their deeply-held views.159
Over time, scholars have begun to realize that while a state may impose
its own law, various other legal systems continue to exist and compete with
the state law system.160 In essence, contrary to conventional wisdom, legal
pluralism, not legal centrism is the norm.161 As with any controversial term,
definitions of legal pluralism are abound. John Griffiths, one of the key
developers of the theory, defines a situation of legal pluralism as:
[O]ne in which law and legal institutions are not all subsumable
within one “system” but have their sources in the self-regulatory
activities . . . which may support, complement, ignore or frustrate
one another, so that the “law” which is actually effective on the
“ground floor” of society is the result of enormously complex and
usually in practice unpredictable patterns of competition,
interaction, negotiation, isolationism, and the like.162
This contrasts sharply with legal centralism, which assumes that the
state is the only source of law.163 Many involved in the Sharī’ah law debate
uncritically accept (or pretend to accept) the assumption of exclusive state
control over law inherent to the notion of legal centralism.164 In reality, legal
pluralism is predominant in virtually all societies.165
The most widely used conception of plural legal systems is Sally Falk
Moore’s notion of the semi-autonomous social field.166 These semiautonomous social fields each have rule-making powers and people abide by
these rules in contexts ranging from classrooms to sports fields to places of
worship.167
159. MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES: EQUALITY, RIGHTS AND DIVERSITY 11 (Avigail Eisenberg
& Jeff Spinner-Halev eds., 2005).
160. See Griffiths, supra note 150, at 38–39; Merry, supra note 150, at 870–71; Brian Z.
Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV.
375, 375 (2008).
161. See Merry, supra note 150, at 869.
162. Griffiths, supra note 150, at 39.
163. Id. at 3.
164. See Patel, supra note 16, at 1–2, 2 n.9.
165. Merry, supra note 150, at 869.
166. See generally Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social
Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973).
167. Id. at 721. For instance boxers can get in the ring and as long as they comply with boxing
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The evolutionary nature of Islamic law168 and the multicultural and
pluralistic nature of American society provide an opportunity to
acknowledge and accept this reality, and to devise a practical model of legal
pluralism that can facilitate a harmonious relationship between Islamic law
and various state and federal laws and systems.169 Indeed, as Moore points
out, the different legal orders exist in relation to each other and, hence, affect
the way that each is able to operate.170 There is a range of possible
relationships that can be devised between Islamic law and state law.171
Miranda Forsyth, for instance, details a typology of seven potential
models of “how to ‘do’ legal pluralism.”172 They range from informal to
formal, and include: (1) “[r]epression of non-state justice system by the state
justice system;” (2) “[f]ormal independence between the systems but tacit
acceptance by the state of the non-state justice system;” (3) “[n]o formal
recognition but active encouragement of non-state justice system by the
state;” (4) “[l]imited formal recognition by the state of the exercise of
jurisdiction by a non-state justice system”; (5) “formal recognition of
exclusive jurisdiction in a defined area;” (6) “state recogni[tion of] the right
of non-state justice system to exercise jurisdiction and lend its coercive
powers”; and (7) “complete incorporation of the non-state justice system by
the state.”173 The level of formality and self-governance will determine what
will be acceptable to each of the perspectives—society as a whole, the state,
and the respective communities whose norms and scope of self-governance
is under negotiation or discussion.174
American policy makers and legislators have much to play with if they
are truly concerned about crafting a workable and constitutionally sound
arrangement to allow religious law and state law to co-exist in their own
social fields.175 In fact, various states and stakeholders have been
regulations (their internal community “law”) the state does not charge a boxer with assault unless the
boxing rules or regulations were broken. How come religious communities are not, for the most
part, granted such autonomy and, if they are, then why do activists have issues with this?
168. Quraishi-Landes, supra, note 74, at 5.
169. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
170. Moore, supra 164, at 723.
171. See infra notes 171–72 and accompanying text.
172. Miranda Forsyth, How to “Do” Legal Pluralism, in LEGAL PLURALISM: CONCEPTS AND
CRITIQUES 1 (Naresh Kumar ed., 2009).
173. Id. at 5–8.
174. Id. at 8–9.
175. See id. at 5–8.

1085

[Vol. 41: 1059, 2014]

“Islamic Law” in US Courts
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

implementing such arrangements for some time.176 In essence, they have
been “doing” legal pluralism.177 Fearing the Sharī’ah bogeyman, some
states have tried to implement the first model from Forsyth’s typology, the
result of which, as we saw in Oklahoma, was found unconstitutional.178 This
model, of course, will not address any of the legitimate concerns raised by
some anti-Sharī’ah advocates, nor will it respect the rights of those who
wish to live their vision of the good life in accordance with their core beliefs,
as promised to them by the project of liberal democracy.179
I would concur with Chandran Kukathas and Jeff Spinner-Halev that the
state, in a multicultural citizenship model, should grant greater selfgovernance powers, particularly over issues central to cultural identity and
preservation.180 This would be consistent with the reality of legal pluralism
that is evident on the ground.181 The state should only intervene when a
community harms its members (or a segment thereof) or the outside
community or when procedural and constitutional norms are violated.182
Such an intervention would only be possible and effective if there was
formal institutionalization of the practice and interaction between the state
and non-state systems.183
A more robust multicultural model-taking cognizance of the reality of
legal pluralism would have also facilitated the indigenization process of
Islamic law.184 Such an indigenization would be in line with the essence of
multiculturalism and legal pluralism.185 Moreover, this would have been one
of the best ways to ensure that the minority community evolves itself using
its own internal mechanisms and through respectful engagement and

176. See, e.g., Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1117–18 (10th Cir. 2012) (exemplifying
Oklahoma’s attempt to implement Forsyth’s first model of typology).
177. See id.
178. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1129–33.
179. Forsyth, supra note 170 at 5.
180. MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES, supra note 157, at 10–11.
181. See Bhabha, supra note 149, at 48–49.
182. Cf. Minorities Within Minorities, supra note 157, at 10–11 (arguing for even less state
intervention in communities).
183. Cf. Forsyth, supra note 170, at 11–12 (describing possible ways the state and communities’
systems can better interact and coexist).
184. Cf. Kutty, supra note 20, at 594 (discussing the indigenization process of Islamic law in
Canada).
185. See id. at 595.
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interaction with the mainstream community.186 This would be consistent
with Miranda Forsyth’s notion of “planned legal pluralism,” which would
“ensure that the various legal systems in a particular jurisdiction operate in
ways that support and enrich each other, rather than undermine and compete
with each other.”187 This is not a farfetched theoretical dream because the
evolutionary and context-specific nature of Islamic law makes it conducive
to the dialectical model within the broader state legal system.188
As scholars have documented, it is impossible to suppress these semiautonomous social fields entirely within a society.189 This Sharī’ah ban
controversy provides a timely opportunity to develop and experiment with
models of legal pluralism that can balance the competing rights in a manner
that attempts to respect all parties and protect the vulnerable.190 It is also a
great occasion to explore how Islamic law and liberal democracy can coexist
and complement each other.
IV. CONCLUSION
The number of religion and state issues brought before the Supreme
Court in recent years underscores an incontrovertible truth in the American
legal system: the relationship between the state and religion in this country is
still fluid and changing.191 To put a twist on a well-known saying from
Mohandas K. Gandhi, those who thought that religion could be separate and
distinct from law understand neither religion nor law. As outrageous as it
may appear to anti-Sharī’ah advocates, if constitutional rights to religious
freedom, equal treatment, and freedom of contract are to have any real value,
religious communities, including Muslims, must be guaranteed access to
justice both in United States courts and outside of the court system. It would
be odd and un-American to insist that Muslims must always couch their
claims in non-religious terms to obtain justice while others need not do so.
The idea that people entering freely into a contract have the right to
agree as to how they settle any disagreements within the confines of state

186. See Forsyth, supra note 170, at 8–9 (giving examples of ways that the state and non-state
systems can interact and engage with one another more productively).
187. Forsyth, supra note 170, at 1.
188. See generally, WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW (2005).
189. Moore, supra note 164, at 720.
190. See Forsyth, supra note 170, at 5–8.
191. See supra Part I.
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law is relatively uncontroversial (provided the normal contractual and legal
protections are in place) outside this anti-Sharī’ah group.192 Consenting and
informed adults must be able to make religious choices even if others do not
believe these are “correct” choices. As Ronald Dworkin says about faith
(albeit not in the context of this controversy):
We can’t ask people to set aside their most profound convictions
about the truth of deep moral and ethical issues when we are also
asking them to make decisions . . . that are for most people the most
basic and fundamental moral and ethical decisions they will in their
lifetime be called upon to make.193
Scholars have advanced various arguments as to why the Establishment
Clause instructs courts not to interfere in cases implicating religious
doctrines or practice. These reasons have ranged from adjudicative
disability (state has limited competence)194 to ensuring that the government
does not favor any one religion or any particular minority or majority view
within a religion.195 These are all legitimate considerations but these
difficulties and complexities do not justify court’s total or complete
prohibition from entertaining religious issues. Moreover, from a religious
freedom and equal treatment perspective, it would be unfair to prevent
Muslims from resorting to courts to have their religious disputes resolved
when this right is available to others. Additionally, from the perspective of
access to justice, as made evident from the plight of the two women from
our introduction, Elahm Soleimani and Rima Nahavandi, in some cases
justice is being denied to deserving Americans simply for the sake of
preserving theoretical purity. Michael Helfand makes a strong case for
192. See supra Part II.
193. Elizabeth Katz, Dworkin Explores Secular, Religious Models for Society, UNIV. VA. SCH. L.
(Apr. 19, 2006), http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2006_spr/dworkin.htm.
194. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between
Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 138 (2009).
195. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14–11, at 1231 (2d ed. 1988).
Tribe also observes that this endorsement concern represents the more fundamental rationale behind
the religious question doctrine over and above the “desire to preserve the autonomy and selfgovernment of religious organizations.” See also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager,
Does It Matter What Religion Is?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 807, 812 (2009); Kent Greenwalt,
Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure Observance of Practices with Religious
Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 804 (1998) (describing the endorsement concern implicated by
various state kosher laws).
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allowing the litigation of certain religious cases (that have traditionally not
been entertained) through the courts when no other forum is available.196 He
points out:
Indeed, the prohibition against litigating religion in judicial forums
has come at a serious cost. As a number of courts have noted,
dismissing a case as non-justiciable under the Establishment Clause
“imposes a harsh consequence on a plaintiff” and “is a drastic
measure, because when a case is nonjusticiable it means the wrong
committed, if there is one, cannot be remedied anywhere.”197
As discussed above and as noted by anti-Sharī’ah advocates, there are
cases where Muslims have sought, directly or indirectly, to use Islamic
principles in resolving aspects of their disputes—as is their right.198 This is
nothing unique to Muslims; people of other faiths have regularly exercised
the same right.199 These cases provide evidence of nothing more than the
fact that, just like non-Muslims, some Muslims may wish to settle their
disputes in accordance with the principles of their faith, and courts will
oblige this desire within the confines of American constitutional law and
judicial practice and precedent. The courts have also rejected such claims—
sometimes for valid reasons, and other times for reasons that we may need to
question in a multi-religious legal pluralistic liberal democracy.
The evidence is clear that courts treat claims by Muslims using religious
law the same way they deal with claims brought by those of other faiths and
those of no faith—sometimes they are accepted and sometimes they are
rejected.200 The nuanced, case-by-case approach that has evolved in the
courts, acting through the prism of established Establishment Clause and

196. Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 493 (2013) (quoting Abdelhak v.
Jewish Press Inc., 985 A.2d 197, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) and Congregation Yetev Lev
D’Satmar, Inc. v. Kahana, 879 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (N.Y. 2007) (Smith, J., dissenting)).
197. Id. at 496.
198. See also Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Application, Recognition, or Consideration of Islamic
Law by Courts in United States, 82 A.L.R. 6, 1 (2013); supra note 123.
199. See, e.g., Persad v. Balram, 187 MISC. 2d 711, 714–15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (holding that
Hindu wedding ceremony resulted in valid marriage despite lack of marriage license because the
evidence “more than adequately established that. . . [the officiant] possessed the requisite authority
under [state statute] to solemnize marriages in the Hindu religion” and “the substance of the
ceremony” was sufficient under the law); see supra Part I.
200. See supra Part I.
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Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, principles of comity, contract law, and
public policy, provides sufficient checks to ensure that courts do not become
impermissibly entangled with religion and do not allow for Islamic law, or
any religious or foreign law for that matter, to become the law of the land.
Indeed, as Matthew Franck, a noted legal analyst at the Conservative
National Review, concluded after reviewing the cases identified as
transforming American legal culture:
Thirty-five years’ worth of American law, and we have a whopping
seven cases in which some “foreign law” was honored (not even
Sharia in every case), and not enough information even to tell if
something truly unjust happened in any of the seven. In the other
thirteen cases, Sharia-law principles were rejected either at trial or
on appeal.201
While his use of the term “Sharia” can be quibbled with, for our
purposes, suffice it to reinforce this paper’s position that far from evidencing
creeping Sharī’ah or a surrender to judicial Jihad, the cases he addresses and
those touched upon in this paper only confirm that the American
Constitution and legal principles stand firm and pre-eminent; Muslims
merely have had access to the dockets, nothing more and nothing less.

201. Matthew Franck, A Solution in Search of a Problem, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 15, 2012,
5:10 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/303028/solution-search-problem-matthewj-franck. The ACLU comes to the same conclusion. PROGRAM ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND
BELIEF: ACLU, NOTHING TO FEAR: DEBUNKING THE MYTHICAL “SHARIA THREAT” TO OUR
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 5 (2011) available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Nothing_To_Fear_Report_
FINAL_MAY_2011.pdf (“Far from confirming some fabricated conspiracy, these cases illustrate
that our judicial system is alive and well, and in no danger of being co-opted or taken over by
Islam.”).
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